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Jones: Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith Damages: Timmons v. Royal Globe

INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH
DAMAGES: TIMMONS v. ROYAL GLOBE
INSURANCE CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent decision of Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,'
the Oklahoma Supreme Court heightened the standard of conduct an
insurance company must meet in dealing with its insureds. In answering the questions of whether an insurance company's conduct must be
outrageous to support a recovery for emotional distress2 and whether
the standard of proof is convincing clarity or a preponderance of the

evidence,3 the court seemingly increased the possibility of plaintiff recovery for the tort of failure to deal in good faith with an insured

claimant.
Although Timmons was not the first Oklahoma case to allow re-

4
covery for an insurer's bad faith in dealing with a first-party claimant,
Timmons is important because of its increasing protection of insured

parties. The opinion changed the emphasis from bad faith to a lack of

good faith, a change which lessens the plaintiff's burden of proof.5 The
resolution of several issues in the case provides assistance to plaintiff

insureds. This Recent Development identifies the protection being offered to insureds, clarifies the conduct which is indicative of a lack of
good faith, and looks at the Oklahoma cases preceding Timmons dem-

onstrating the recent evolution in Oklahoma of a cause of action
designed to safeguard the "peace of mind" purchased by insured par-

ties by payment of insurance premiums.
1. 53 OKLA. B.J. 1898 (1982).
2. Id. at 1904.
3. Id. at 1901.
4. The tort was first recognized in Oklahoma in the case of Christian v. American Home
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977), in which the plaintiff was permitted recovery for defendant's bad faith refusal to pay a disability claim.
5. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1902. The court held that bad faith is not a fundamental issue in a
Christian type case. Rather, the issue is whether there has been a breach of the duty to deal in
good faith. Id. at 1902-03.
6. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(1967) ("Among the considerations in purchasing. . . insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the
peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss."); McCorkle v. Great
Atl. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) ("[Tlhe purchaser of insurance [contracts] to protect
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FACTS

Royal Globe was the insurer of a Piper aircraft piloted by John D.
Timmons at the time of its crash. Royal Globe's investigator, on different occasions, identified himself as a salvage buyer, an investigator
working for Royal Globe, and an investigator representing Flight Investigators, Inc. Although the investigator noted in a memorandum
that the aircraft's airworthiness certificate, later missing, was on the airplane at the crash site, he failed to report its presence to the Federal
Aviation Administration. A Royal Globe representative informed
Timmons that a guard would be unnecessary due to the remoteness of
the crash site. However, when theft did occur, Royal Globe listed failure to guard against pilferage as a reason to deny coverage. Rather
than obtaining Timmons' authorization to view his records to clear up
confusion relating to his medical certificate, Royal Globe contacted an

anonymous source within the F.A.A. Even after Timmons was issued a
new certificate, Royal Globe continued to contend that there was some
problem concerning his medical certificate. 7

Further, Royal Globe cited failure to cooperate as a reason for
denying coverage even though Timmons had turned over all relevant
documents to the company shortly after the crash. In addition, Timmons was told that a more favorable settlement could be reached if he

would discharge his attorney."
At trial, a jury returned a verdict for Timmons of $9,126.86 actual
damages, $25,000 for mental pain and suffering, and $3,000,000 puni-

tive damages against Royal Globe and its representative, David
Sowards. 9 On appeal, Royal Globe asserted that an instruction, stating

that the burden of proof in a first-party bad faith case' 0 is a preponderance of the evidence, was prejudicial error; I that it was error to refuse
himself/herself against the risks of accidental losses and the mental stress which could result from
such losses."); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1977) (quoting the "peace of mind" rationale found in Crisei and Fletcher).
7. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1899.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1898. However, Sowards appealed on the theory that his demurrer should have
been sustained because he was not a party to the contract. Id. at 1901. The court agreed, stating,
"[I]t
is clear that the cause will not lie against a stranger to the contract." Id.
10. First-party bad faith cases are those such as Timmons in which the insured directly makes
a claim against the insurer. They are to be distinguished from third-party bad faith cases, where a
third party makes a claim against the insured, the insured ca!ls on the insurer to defend the claim,
and the insurer fails to defend in good faith or to make a reasonable settlement within the policy
limits. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
11. 53 OKLA.B.J. at 1901. The defendant relied on language in Christian v. American Home
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to provide the jury with a definition of bad faith 12 or good faith;' and
that the defendants' actions were not outrageous enough to support an
award for mental anguish. 4
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the burden of proof in
a first-party bad faith case is a preponderance of the evidence;' that it
is not error for the trial court to refuse to define bad faith' 6 or good
faith; 7 and that an insurer's conduct need not be outrageous to support
an award for mental suffering.' 8 In dictum, the court stated that mental
suffering need not be severe when it is an element of damages in a bad

faith claim.19
III.

THE RISE OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN FIRST-PARTY
CLAIMS IN OKLAHOMA

Insurance companies are held to owe a special duty to their customers.20 The opinions have stressed the quasi-public nature of insurance companies, the consumer's lack of bargaining power, and the
resultant high degree of government regulation as grounds for extending the protection offered to insurance purchasers. 2 1 In its first recognition of the tort of bad faith dealing with an insured's first-party
claim in Christian v. American Home Assurance Co. ,22 the Oklahoma
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977), referring to "a clear showing of bad faith by the insurer." Id. at 905.
12. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1902.
13. Id. at 1903.

14. Id. at 1904.
15. Id. at 1901. The court stated that the "clear showing" language in Christianrelied upon
by the defendants was not intended to vary the burden of proof and that had the court intended to
vary the burden from the standard burden in a civil case, it would have done so explicitly.
16. Id. at 1902. The court stated that "a judgment will not be reversed for refusal to give
additional or more detailed instructions requested by the appealing party where that refusal does
not appear to have resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice ... if the cause was submitted to the jury
under proper instructions on fundamental issues." Id. The court went on to say that bad faith is
not a fundamental issue in a Christian type case. Id.
17. Id. at 1903. The instruction given was that recovery by the plaintiff required a finding
that the defendants did not act in good faith. The appellants did not show the court that they
requested an instruction defining fair dealing and good faith, so the court refused to find the lack
of the instruction to be error. Id.
18. Id. at 1904. In allowing recovery in the absence of outrageous conduct, the court relied
on St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 P. 779 (1924), a case in which a war
veteran was permitted recovery for emotional distress against the railway based on its agent's
roughly stated refusal to honor a government travel requisition to a hospital. The court in Timmons did reduce the amount of punitive damages to $1,500,000 because the $3,000,000 award was
the result of an "improper sympathetic response on the part of the jury." 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1906.
19. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1904.
20. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
21. Id.

22. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); see note 4 supra.
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Supreme Court stated,
This is a distinct tort based upon an implied duty of the in-

surer to act in good faith and deal fairly with its insured. This
duty is not consensual; it is imposed by law. Breach of the

duty sounds in tort, notwithstanding that it also constitutes a
breach of contract, and plaintiff insured may recover conse-

quential and, in a proper case, punitive damages.23
Prior to the Christian case, the rule'had been that an insurance company could be liable for no more than the money benefits due under

the contract.24
Not unexpectedly, the argument soon was made by insurance
companies that the tort recognized in Christianapplied only to limited
types of insurance. 25 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
standard is applicable to all types of insurance companies 26 and that
reasonableness is a question for the trier of fact.2 7
As insurance companies pressed to limit Christian, plaintiffs
pushed for expansion of the protection being offered. In Wyman v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.,28 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals, applying Oklahoma law, refused to expand good faith to include
a duty to warn the plaintiff of the statute of limitations.
IV.

2 9

CONDUCT CONSTITUTING BAD FAITH

Since the reasonableness standard 30 is to be determined by the
trier of fact, 3 1 probably a jury, and there is no requirement that the trial
23. Id. at 901.
24. Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 528 P.2d 1135 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
25. McCorkle v. Great AtI. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981). The insurer claimed that
the amounts due under fire insurance claims are inherently unascertained and that allowing recovery for punitive damages in a bad faith case in which the amount is unascertained denies the
insurer its opportunity to have the amount due judicially determined. Id.
26. Id. at 588.
27. Id. at 587. "[Ijf there is conflicting evidence from which different inferences may be
drawn regarding the reasonableness of insurer's conduct, then what is reasonable is always a question to be determined by the trier of fact by a consideration of the circumstances in each case." Id.
28. 656 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1981).
29. Bad faith was defined and the use of the term criticized in Austero v. National Casualty
Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978). "In our view the words bad faith are actually an
imprecise label for what is essentially some kind ofunreasonableinsurer conduct, and such words
serve only to obscure and oversimplify the rationale of the decisions in this broad subject-matter
area." Id. at 26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 670 n.22 (emphasis in original). The term "unreasonable"
comes no closer to clarifying the prohibited behavior than the words "bad faith."
30. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977). "Mort liability
may be imposed only where there is a clear showing that the insurer unreasonably, and in bad
faith, withholds payment of the claim of its insured." Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
31. McCorkle v. Great At. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981); see supra note 27.
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judge define bad faith32 or good faith,3 3 there exists little guidance re-

garding precisely what conduct will result in liability. The only indications available are those cases in which conduct has been found to be

unreasonable. Since Oklahoma law in this area is largely borrowed
from California law,34 both Oklahoma and California cases will be
considered as indicators. The types of conduct that have been found to

constitute bad faith are failure to communicate, 35 intimidation and deceit,3 6 failure to investigate, 37 falsely accusing the claimant,38 and refusing payment with no valid defense.3 9
Lack of communication in the form of failure to send notice of a
denial of coverage directly to the insured can lead to liability. 40 The

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of communication when it stated, "[I]t does not appear unreasonable to re-

quire the insurance company, under the general duty of good faith and
fair dealing, to inform the insured of any questions that it has as to

liability so that the insured can supply additional proof if necessary.'
At times, it is the form and manner of communication which causes

problems. Liability has been found in circumstances in which an insur32. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 53

OKLA.

B.J. 1898 (1982); see supra note 16.

33. Id. at 1903; see supra note 17.

34. The Christian case relied heavily upon Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) and Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d
1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). See note 4 supra.
35. See, e.g., Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978); Phillips v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D.C. Vt. 1979) (the court cited Christian in holding that
Vermont law allowed recovery of punitive damages for bad faith rejection of a claim).
36. See, e.g., Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978); Mustachio
v. Ohio Farmer's Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975); Fletcher v. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 53 OKLA. B.J.
1898 (1982).
37. See, e.g., Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978); Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 31, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 673 (1978);
Mustachio v. Ohio Farmer's Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979); Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978).
40. See Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D.C. Vt. 1979), in which the company sent the notice of denial of coverage to the hospital. Id. at 987-88. When the company
realized it may have been mistaken in denying benefits, it did not notify the claimant. Id. at 987.
This total lack of direct communication led to liability. See id. at 990.
41. Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1978) (footnotes omitted). But cf.Wyman v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 656 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1981) (insurer
is not required to inform insured of statute of limitations). Craft suggests that if the insured has
failed to produce the information which is necessary in order for the insurer to be obligated to
pay, the insurer must tell the insured what information is missing. Wyman rejected similar reasoning as to the statute of limitations. 656 F.2d at 604-05.
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ance company attempts to pressure plaintiffs into settling for less than
the fair value of the claim,42 or tries to extract additional consideration
before paying the claims for which it is liable.43 In Fletcher v. Western
NationalLife Insurance Co.,' a case heavily relied upon by the Christian court, the court found that "defendants' threatened and actual bad
faith refusals to make payments under the policy, maliciously employed by defendants in concert with false arid threatening communications directed to plaintiff for the purpose of causing him to surrender
his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dispute is essentially tortious in nature. ' 4 In Timmons, the plaintiff was told that a
more favorable settlement could be reached if he would dismiss his
attorney.46
There is also authority that "an insurer may breach the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing when it fails to properly investigate its
insured's claim"'47 and denies the claim based on the information supplied by the claimant. However, the cases are not uniform in this view.
The argument that "a breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing
can be found even where the insurer maintains actual, non-reckless
doubts as to its liability, if a reasonable investigation would have disclosed information making those doubts untenable" was rejected by
the Seventh Circuit. 48 The court reasoned that this premise "conflicts
with the accepted law that the insured has the burden of showing that
the preconditions to the insurance company's obligation to pay have
been met."49
Another ground for denying payment which may be tempting to
42. Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978).
43. Id. The additional consideration consisted of a dismissal of the breach of contract claim,
ld. at 571, 573.
44. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
45. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. The court found liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and stated that a cause of action also existed for bad faith dealing. See also
Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 362, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (1975) ("An
insurance company which has no defense to a claim as such, has no business threatening to retire
its file if the claimant does not accept its first offer.").
46. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1899.
47. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 817, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482, 486 (1979). "[Ain insurer cannot reasonably and in good faith deny payments to its insured
without thoroughly investigating the foundation for its denial." Id. at 819, 598 P.2d at 457, 157
Cal. Rptr. at 487.
48. Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 1978).
49. Id. at 572. See also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 828, 598 P.2d 452,
563, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 493 (1979) (Clark, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent
would have held that the insurer had acted in a reasonable manner, relying on credible evidence
that no further benefits were due, and that it should not be required to pay punitive damages. He
further stated that were the majority approach followed, "[ilnsurers would be unable to litigate
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insurance companies is that of the claimant's fraud. While the courts
have recognized that fraudulent claims are indeed a real problem for
insurers, 5° the insurers must have a reasonable basis for accusations of

fraud or other wrongdoing. Insinuations that the claimant is guilty of
arson when there is no evidence to support such a contention have been

5
held to be strong evidence of bad faith and have led to liability. '
The final form of conduct that subjects insurers to liability is usu-

ally present when any of the other prohibited behaviors is present. Re-

fusing to pay benefits without a valid defense will lead to liability for
all the damages consequent to this refusal. Thus, the issue of how

strong a defense must be before an insurer is safe in denying benefits
becomes significant. The concern since early cases has been that the

insurance company would be subjected to a form of strict liabilitythat it would be liable for large awards of consequential and punitive
damages any time it refused to pay a claim, even if it were reasonable

to so refuse.52 The Christian decision dealt with this issue, stating, "We
do not hold that an insurer who resists and litigates a claim made by its

insured does so at its peril that if it loses the suit or suffers a judgment
against it for a larger amount than it had offered in payment, it will be

held to have breached its duty to act fairly and in good faith and thus
be liable in tort."5 3 In fact, however, the reasonableness of the insur-

ance company's refusal to pay is usually assessed after the validity of
the claim has been determined.5 4 And while the courts attempt to elimquestionable claims and would be required in all cases to avoid potential liability for punitive
damages." Id. at 829, 598 P.2d at 463, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
50. See Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978), in
which the court stated, "[Ain insurer is not required to pay every claim presented to it. Besides the
duty to deal fairly with the insured, the insurer also has a duty to its other policyholders and to the
stockholders. . . not to dissipate its reserves through the payment of meritless claims." Id. at 30,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
51. See, e.g., Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 362, 118 Cal. Rptr.
581, 583 (1975) (the insurer "violates every principle of good faith and fair dealing to intimate to
the assured that he is suspected of arson when any basis for such a charge has been eliminated by
the only investigator employed to look into it"); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 57072, 510 P.2d 1032, 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 482-83 (1973) (statements of the insurance investigator to the police and court that the claimant was overinsured led to a police investigation).
52. This strict liability was called an "act-at-your-own-risk" rule in Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978), a case which denied that such strict
liability was the rule. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d at 829, 598 P.2d at 463,
157 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (Clark, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), discussed supra note 49.
53. 577 P.2d at 904-05; see Justice Clark's dissent in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24
Cal. 3d at 824, 598 P.2d at 460, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490, discussed supra note 49.
54. See, e.g., Elliano v. Assurance Co. of Amer., 45 Cal. App. 3d 170, 119 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1975). "Central to this case is a fact which sharply distinguishes it from others where liability
based on bad faith was found. . . . That fact is that negotiations following the fire produced an
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inate hindsight, 5 the trier of fact may not realistically be able to view
the facts without being affected by a finding as to the validity of the
claim.
Since insurers are to be held answerable for their unreasonable
refusals to pay claims, 56 it is important that they follow recommendations made by investigators and local personnel conversant with the
facts. In several cases, the local office investigated the claim and recommended payment of the claim to the home office, which refused to
pay. 7 Documentation of such recommendations can be fatal to the
insurer's defense to the plaintiffs allegations of bad faith.
V.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The cases have made it clear that a showing of a breach of the
implied convenant to deal fairly will not automatically result in an
award of punitive damages.5 " To be subject to punitive damages, the
defendant "must act with intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of plaintiffs rights."5 9 This intent can be shown by
. 6 The question becomes whether the insurer's
circumstantial evidence
3
offer from defendant ...of almost twice the amount ultimately found by the court to be due."
Id. at 183-84, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
55. See, e.g., Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978).

"The reasonable or unreasonable action by the Company must be measured as of the time it was
confronted with a factual situation to which it was called upon to respond." Id. at 32, 148 Cal.

Rptr. at 673.
56. See 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1902-03 (interpreting the standard as a lack of good faith rather than
affirmative bad faith).
57. See, eg., Richardson v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1972) (overruled as to the requirement that emotional distress be severe in order for
recovery to be proper in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 581, 510 P.2d 1032, 1042, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 n.10 (1973)) (the local office determined that the automobile accident was
caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist; the home office had a policy that uninsured
motorist claims should be paid only as a last resort and refused prompt payment); Mustachio v.
Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App..3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975) (the investigator hired to
look into the fire determined that the claimant had nothing to do with the arson; nonetheless, the
insurance company's representative insinuated that plaintiff had set the fire).
58. See Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 27, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 670
(1978) ("[TIhe measure of damages . . . includes both economic losses and compensation for
emotional distress, and, in appropriate circumstances, exemplary damages."); McCorkle v. Great
Ad. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) ("In qualifying our approval of punitive damages,
with the words 'in a proper case' and 'may', we reject appellant's argument that Christianstands
for our indiscriminate approval of punitive damages."); Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co., 577 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. 1977) ("[P]laintiff insured may recover consequential and, in a
proper case, punitive, damages.").
59. Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607
(1976).
60. Richardson, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 245, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 556. "Actual malice must be shown
in order for punitive damages to be awarded, but this malice, including malicious intent, may be
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conduct was only bad enough to show a lack of good faith and fair

dealing or bad enough to show an affirmative intent to vex, injure, or
annoy. The determination of whether the defendant should be sub-

jected to punitive damages is left to the trier of fact, 6 who is to focus on

the unreasonableness of the insurer's act.6 2 Only if it is obvious that the

jury is swayed by passion, prejudice, or improper sympathy, or that the
award is obviously excessive, will the award of punitive damages be
overturned.63
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because of the change of standard in Timmons, plaintiffs may be

more likely in the future to recover against insurers who have failed to
deal in good faith in the settlement of claims. Greatest recoveries are

likely to be damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. It is
no longer necessary for the plaintiff to show severe distress or outra-

geous conduct when the damages for emotional distress are part of a
recovery for bad faith dealing. 64 Punitive damages can be awarded if
the conduct of the insurer is objectionable enough to warrant a finding

of an intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or a total disregard for the plain-

tiff's rights.65

Insurance companies are subjected to a special standard of conduct in dealing with their insureds. 6 6 They do not sell a product; they
68
sell mental security67 in providing what is essentially a public service.
inferred from the circumstances of the case." Id. Malicious intent to vex or annoy was found by
looking at the company's refusal to pay a claim it knew was valid. Id.; 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1905 ("[A]
person may commit such wilful acts in reckless disregard of another's rights that malice will be
inferred") (quoting from Oden v. Russell, 207 Okla. 570, 251 P.2d 184 (1952)).
61. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1906. "[A] punitive damage verdict is peculiarly within the province of
the jury." Id.
62. McCorkle v. Great Atd. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) ("We trust that the trier
of fact will award them [punitive damages] only in a proper case, with the focus always on the
unreasonableness of the insurer's conduct.' (emphasis in original)).
63. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 1906. Factors to be considered in finding an award of punitive damages
are the harm caused to society by the type of conduct the defendant has committed, and the value
of restraining the defendant and deterring others from committing similar wrongs. It is reasonable, in determining the amount of punitive damages, to consider the defendant's financial condition. Id.
64. Id. at 1904.
65. Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 355, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607
(1976).
66. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
67. See Fletcher v. National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970);
Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
68. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902.
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Due to their quasi-public nature, insurers are highly regulated.6 9 A potential plaintiff must view the insurer's conduct with an eye for its reasonableness or unreasonableness in light of the insurer's place in
society. Also, in dealing with terms such as "reasonable," "good faith,"
and "fair," a plaintiff must remain alert to the fact that these are terms
that are defined differently by different persons and courts at different
times.
Stephanie L Jones
69. 577 P.2d at 902.
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